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Some Revisions of a Gray Market
Decalogue: A Response to Messrs.
Lewin and Steele
by WILLIAM H. ALLEN*
During the last several years, I have represented the Coali-
tion to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
(COPIAT),' a group committed to the protection of consumers
through its desire to keep gray market goods 2 from reaching
the United States. Two of my adversaries in gray market litiga-
tion include Mr. Steele3 and Nathan Lewin. In a recent debate,
Mr. Lewin used as his text a law review article that he had
written, The Ten Commandments of Parallel Importation.4 He
thought the biblical title appropriate for three reasons: first,
both sides see the gray market dispute "as a battle between
good and evil."' Second, those of us engaged in the litigation
have had to go so far back - studying legislation and litigation
now 65 years old, and trademark cases from even earlier times
- that "the effort to discern legislative intent accurately turns
legal research into quasi-archeology."6 Third, "the governing
principles on each side can be reduced to majestic pronounce-
ments that have a biblical ring to them."
7
Needless to say, the Decalogue that followed was one side's
pronouncement of the governing principles. This article will
show the other side.
Some of Mr. Lewin's commandments concern the manner of
construing statutes, particularly section 526 of the Tariff Act of
* Member, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1. The Coalition is respondent in COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844
(D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986)
(argued Oct. 6, 1987).
2. "[G]oods manufactured abroad bearing legitimate foreign trademarks that are
identical to American trademarks." COPLAT, 790 F.2d at 904.
3. See Mr. Steele's article earlier in this issue.
4. Lewin, The Ten Commandments qf Parallel Importation, 18 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. J. 217 (1986).
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1930.8 While I am tempted to respond, the Supreme Court may
decide what section 526 means, in the COPIAT case, pending
before the Justices. If the COPIAT case came down before pub-
lication of these comments, my animadversions on Mr. Lewin's
Sixth Commandment, decrying "plain meaning" as a reason for
"invoking [section 526] to protect foreign manufacturers,"
would sound like either gloating or sour grapes.9
Instead, I shall try in this article to rebut some of Mr.
Lewin's other commandments, those that implicate policy more
than law. I shall try to demonstrate that there is a policy argu-
ment, as well as a legal argument, for enforcing section 526 as it
is written, and not as the Customs Service has rewritten it.
Section 526 says that it shall be unlawful, in the absence of
the consent of the United States trademark owner, to import
into the United States goods of foreign manufacture bearing a
trademark "owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or associ-
ation created or organized within, the United States" and regis-
tered by a person domiciled in the United States.
10 The
Customs Service's regulations," on the other hand, in effect say
that it shall be lawful to import goods bearing such a trademark
if the trademark affixed to them and the identical United
States trademark are owned by the same company or by com-
panies that are "parent and subsidiary companies or are other-
wise subject to common ownership or control."'" The Customs
Service will also allow importation of goods if the foreign trade-
mark is affixed with the authority of the United States trade-
mark owner.' 3 The Customs Service regulations are what
make so-called gray-market imports possible.
My argument on behalf of COPIAT has been that these regu-
lations are incompatible with the statute they purport to inter-
pret. Here my point is that they make no sense economically,
and that consumers should not applaud the Service's eviscera-
tion of the statute.
8. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (1930), as amended by the Cus-
toms Procedural and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-401, Title II, § 211 (a),
(c), 92 Stat. 888 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1980)).
9. On March 7, 1988, the Supreme Court decided the jurisdiction question in the
case, but set the case for reargument on the merits. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108
S.Ct. 950 (1988).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1980).
11. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1987).
12. Id. at § W33.21(c)(1),(2).
13. 1& at § 133.21(c)(3).
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Mr. Lewin's Eighth Commandment reads: "Thou shalt not
steal the substantial benefit that dealers who advertise and ser-
vice parallel imports confer upon foreign-manufactured prod-
ucts and trademarks by claiming that they engage only in free
rides.' 1 4 Mr. Lewin is straining for parallelism with the origi-
nal,' 5 but his point is discernible. The point is mistaken. The
free ride is the heart of the gray market. While Mr. Lewin's
client, 47th Street Photo, and Mr. Steele's client, K Mart, ad-
vertise, their advertising is to encourage people to buy, at their
establishments (not at some other establishment) the brands of
goods with which people are already familiar. Their advertis-
ing of the trademarked goods they have for sale is evidence of
the free ride, not a refutation of it.
Familiarity with a brand name that is associated with a par-
ticular trademark and particular goods is the result of advertis-
ing and promotion done by the manufacturer or authorized
distributor of the product in the United States. The cost of pro-
motion, pre-sale service, and post-sale warranties is what the
gray market importer rides on free. The product that is distrib-
uted through authorized channels must reflect those advertis-
ing, promotional, and service expenses, while the gray market
product does not. That is what makes the gray market econom-
ical. The incentive to import gray market goods into the
United States will exist whenever the cost of transporting a
product to the United States is less than the advertising and
promotional expenses that must be included in the price of the
product as sold through authorized channels in the United
States.
Theoretically, and perhaps sometimes in fact, the gray mar-
ket can result from arbitraging of price differentials. In other
words, sometimes the price charged to the United States dis-
tributor of a product may be higher than the prices charged to
other national distributors abroad, and one is thereby enabled
to make a profit on the difference by buying abroad, importing,
and reselling in the United States. However, many of the goods
for which there has been a thriving gray market in the United
States are manufactured here, and there is intense interbrand
competition among those goods, whether manufactured here or
abroad. It is fanciful to think that in very many cases there is
14. Lewin, supra note 4, at 233.
15. See Exodus 20:36 (Old Testament): "Thou shalt not steal."
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systematic discrimination in price against American consum-
ers. No camera manufacturer or perfume maker could keep his
share of the United States market if he charged an artificially
high price to his United States distributor. The competition
would not permit it.
Mr. Lewin espouses the fanciful when he says, in his Seventh
Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill the U.S. consumer by en-
abling foreign manufacturers to charge artificially high and in-
flated prices in a shielded U.S. market.""6 Having spent some
time in Italy last summer, I find the idea that the United States
is peculiarly characterized by "high and inflated prices" of
goods sold worldwide dizzyingly unreal. Admittedly, that is
just personal experience, but Congressman Richard Gephardt
(D-MO) has presumably made a more systematic analysis of
the high prices that are charged in Korea and Japan for goods
that have lower prices in the United States, as a basis for his
campaign utterances on the point.
Besides, Mr. Lewin's Seventh Commandment cannot be rec-
onciled with the facts that underlie his Second Commandment:
"Thou shalt have no other legal standards for foreign producers
doing business in the United States than the legal standards
U.S. producers must abide by in foreign countries."'
7 Mr.
Lewin believes that most of our trading partners permit the
sale of gray market goods. I do not mean to quarrel with that
proposition here. But consider the implications of that proposi-
tion: if there was systematic discrimination in price against the
United States, our trading partners would never have occasion
to consider whether to permit or forbid the importation of gray
market goods.
In his Seventh Commandment Mr. Lewin speaks of "foreign
manufacturers," and in his Second Commandment of "foreign
producers." This is a way of saying that Mr. Lewin and Mr.
Steele find it much easier to make their legal and economic ar-
guments when they pretend that the gray market in the United
States involves only goods produced by foreign manufacturers.
That, however, is not the case at all. Goods are manufactured
abroad by the most American of companies: the Detroit auto-
mobile manufacturers, Procter & Gamble, Kodak, and
Duracell, to name just a few. Those companies, just as much as
16. Lewin, supra note 4, at 232.
17. Lewin, supra note 4, at 219.
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Nikon, Seiko, or Michelin, are denied protection from the un-
authorized importation of goods bearing their products' trade-
mark because of the Customs Service regulations interpreting
section 526.
Finally, I advert to the Fourth and Fifth of Mr. Lewin's Com-
mandments.18 In the one, he asks us to remember the facts of
the famous Katzel case,' 9 and in the other, he asserts that "Con-
gress did not intend to give a foreign company, even though act-
ing through a United States subsidiary, the right to control the
flow of its own products into the United States."0 He thereby
seeks to distinguish the independent distributor/trademark
owner in Katzel from the owned or controlled distributor/
trademark owner.
There is no meaningful distinction. There is no economic dif-
ference between the manufacturer that chooses to do business
in this country through a wholly-owned subsidiary distributor
and the manufacturer that chooses to do business through an
exclusive independent distributor. If the intrabrand competi-
tion that the Customs Service regulations encourage in the case
of the wholly-owned distributor is a good thing for consumers,
then Mrs. Katzel's intrabrand competition with the trade-
marked Java face powder, for which the Bourjois Company was
the designated exclusive distributor in the United States, was
also a good thing.
But, neither kind of intrabrand competition is in fact good for
consumers. Consumers may realize some short-term savings in
some items from the gray market, but these savings, if they ex-
ist at all, are at the possible cost of buying a different product
than the one the purchaser is accustomed to and is expecting
and wants, and suffering a lack of the warranty that accompa-
nies an authorized product.
In the long run, the consumer will suffer because advertising
and other promotional activities that go into interbrand compe-
tition will atrophy if the free ride becomes too extensive. Vig-
orous interbrand competition benefits the consumer by
18. Id. at 244, 247.
19. A. BourJois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (opinion by Holmes, J.). Kat-
zel concerned the importation from France of Java face powder by one Mrs. Katzel,
who sold the powder in the United States. The American trademark holder, Bourjois,
sought an injunction for infringement of trademark, and the Supreme Court, revers-
ing the Second Circuit, ultimately held that an injunction was warranted. I& at 692.
20. Lewin, supra note 4, at 227.
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providing an abundance of goods at low prices. Protection of
trademarks is essential to vigorous interbrand competition.
